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ARTICLE
PRACTICAL WISDOM:
REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION
DAISY HURST FLOYD*
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
We are at a moment of both crisis and opportunity in American legal
education. Recent public criticism of what we do and how we do it has
generated heated debate. Justifiable concerns about the high cost of a legal
education, a difficult job market for recent graduates in the midst of unmet
needs for legal services, the influence of rankings, the proliferation of law
schools, and a shrinking applicant pool call into question both the purpose
and value of legal education.1 It is a time that calls for innovation, creativ-
ity, and rethinking legal education’s goals and methods. It is a time to
reimagine the education our students receive. This symposium, which fo-
cuses on identity formation as a primary purpose of law school and urges
* Daisy Hurst Floyd is University Professor of Law and Ethical Formation at Mercer Uni-
versity School of Law. This work was supported by a grant from Mercer University School of
Law. I am grateful to Mercer Dean Gary Simson for his support and to the Holloran Center for
Ethical Leadership in the Professions and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for support-
ing work on ethical formation.
1. See generally David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; David Segal,
What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.ny
times.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted
=all; David Segal, For Law Schools, A Price to Play the ABA’s Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/for-law-schools-a-price-to-play-the-abas-way.html?
pagewanted=all; Chris Mondics, Villanova Law Censured by ABA Over Admissions-Data Fraud,
But Retains Accreditation, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 16, 2011, http://articles.philly.com/
2011-08-16/business/29892664_1_law-school-american-bar-association-lsat-scores; Ameet
Sachdev, U of I Law School Falls 12 Spots, to No. 35, in U.S. News and World Report List: Lower
Ranking Related to Admissions Scandal Last Fall, CHI. TRIB., March 15, 2012, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2012-03-15/business/ct-biz-0315-law-rankings-20120315_1_median-gpa-me
dian-lsat-score-admissions-scandal; David Segal, Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Schools
Win, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-
grants.html?pagewanted=all; Katherine Mangan, Lawsuits Over Job-Placement Rates Threaten 20
More Law Schools, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., March 14, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Law
suits-Over-Job-Placement/131163/ (for some of the recent negative attention to law schools in the
popular press).
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legal educators to think empirically about ways to meet that purpose, is a
positive step toward reaching that goal.2
We can reimagine legal education by taking seriously the ethical for-
mation of our students. A focus on ethical formation requires us to consider
not just what lawyers should know and what they should do, but also who
they should be in order to live out the best ideals of the profession. It re-
quires us to envision our graduates as the lawyers they will be. It demands
that we think about the multiple capacities we want our graduates to use in
the service of their clients and their profession. This article proposes that we
conceive of the purpose of ethical formation as developing lawyers who can
exercise practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is an ancient concept, derived
from Aristotle, which has continuing resonance for modern life and particu-
larly for modern professional life.
To make the case that we need lawyers with practical wisdom, I will
start by imagining our students as they will be some years from now. Please
consider with me three former law students—Nick, Daphne, and Maria—
who are now experienced lawyers. We meet each of them at a particular
moment of professional practice, in which they are called upon to act out of
their professional knowledge, education, and experience.
A. Moments of Professional Practice: Three Lawyers
1. Nick
Nick has been a lawyer for just over six years, practicing as an associ-
ate in a mid-sized law firm. The firm will be deciding very soon whether he
will be invited to partnership. Nick’s practice focuses on transactional mat-
ters. He has recently been representing one of the firm’s regular clients, the
owner of a large manufacturing facility, in negotiating an agreement with
an import company for the regular purchase of materials. The negotiations
developed an impasse over a particular provision that the other party insists
on putting into the contract. The provision is an escape clause from the
contract in the event that natural disaster or civil unrest in the country of
origin makes the material either difficult or more expensive to import.
Nick’s client was adamant that he will not agree to the provision, even
though it is unlikely to be invoked during the two-year term of the contract.
After heated negotiations, Nick believes that he and the other lawyer have
agreed that the contract will not include the contingency provision. The
other lawyer sends Nick the final version of the agreement. Because Nick is
2. Another positive sign is the creation of the Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers consortium
(“ETL”), which has brought together law schools that are committed to reform of legal education
along the lines suggested by the Carnegie Foundation’s study of legal education. ETL’s first an-
nual symposium, focused on the development of professional identity, was held at the University
of Denver on September 27–29, 2012, bringing together representatives from over twenty law
schools with practitioners and experts from other disciplines to discuss ways to advance innova-
tion in legal education.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-NOV-13 15:04
2012] PRACTICAL WISDOM: REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION 197
in a hurry and distracted by other matters, he overlooks the fact that the
twenty-three page contract actually has the disputed provision in it. Three
days after his client has signed the contract, Nick discovers the mistake. It is
a week before his partnership vote. What should Nick do?3
2. Daphne
Daphne is more experienced than Nick; she is a lawyer of twenty
years. Her practice has been in criminal law, first as an assistant district
attorney and for the last ten years in a private criminal defense practice. She
is an excellent trial lawyer with a reputation among the local bench and bar
as a forceful advocate for her clients and a “person of her word.” She is
currently representing Carla, who is charged with murder in the shooting
death of her husband. The evidence is undisputed that Carla was subject to
abuse at the hands of her husband for many years and that she shot him in
the back of the head while he was sleeping.
Daphne plans to use a defense of battered woman syndrome, which
will require an expert witness to explain to the jury that the years of abuse
that Carla suffered meant that she was in fear of her life when she killed her
husband, even though at that moment he was asleep and not actively threat-
ening her. Daphne is confident in her trial skills but also aware that battered
woman syndrome can be a hard sell to jurors. Usually, self-defense requires
that the defendant is under an immediate threat of bodily harm at the time
of the killing. During the time that Daphne has been representing Carla,
they have spent a lot of time together. Daphne knows that one of Carla’s
major concerns is what will happen to her two children—ages two and
six—should she be sent to prison. She has been able to care for the children
while on bail.
Just before the trial begins, the prosecutor comes to Daphne with a
plea offer. If Carla will plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, he will rec-
ommend that the judge sentence her to three to five years. Daphne must
meet with Carla to tell her about the offer and to help her make a decision
about whether to take the offer or go to trial. If she takes the offer, she will
be taken into custody immediately after making the plea and her children
will be put into foster care. If she goes to trial, she has a chance of acquittal,
but if she is convicted, she will likely be sentenced to twenty years in
prison. They have forty-five minutes for Daphne to explain the options to
Carla and to help her reach a decision. How should Daphne handle the
conversation?4
3. This hypothetical is based upon one developed by my Mercer Law School colleagues,
Professors Patrick Longan and Karen Sneddon, for use in teaching ethics issues in contracts. See
SUSAN M. CHESLER ET. AL., TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A LAWYER 73–77
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2012).
4. This hypothetical is based upon the Theresa Trujillo problem, which was developed by
my Mercer Law School colleague Professor David Oedel for use in Mercer Law School’s Intro-
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3. Maria
Maria is a trial lawyer in a large civil-litigation firm, handling prima-
rily the defense of personal injury claims brought against a major automo-
bile manufacturer. She graduated from law school almost thirty years ago.
Although most of her cases settle, a particularly difficult case has come to
trial. The plaintiff is a thirty-two year old man who suffered severe and
permanent injuries from an allegedly defective automobile manufactured by
Maria’s client. There is an issue in the case about whether the plaintiff was
wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. The physical evidence is
inconclusive, but the plaintiff claims that he was wearing his seat belt. Ma-
ria knows that cross-examining a severely-injured plaintiff must be handled
carefully; she also knows that making the client seem unappealing to the
jury is likely to affect their view of his credibility and hence their decision
about liability and possibly damages. She also knows that if the jurors per-
ceive that she is attacking an injured plaintiff, it can turn them against her
client and increase the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict. Based on her expe-
rience while deposing the plaintiff, Maria is aware that he dislikes discuss-
ing his injuries, particularly the effect they have had on both his private and
professional life. In fact, during the deposition, the plaintiff reacted to this
line of questioning by insulting Maria and almost losing control. While Ma-
ria is cross-examining the plaintiff at trial, she senses that he is becoming
angry and emotional. She must decide in the moment whether to pursue
aggressive questioning or to refrain from such questioning to avoid the risk
of backlash from the jury.
B. The Challenges of Ethical Action
In each of these situations, the lawyer is called upon to act as both a
moral human being and an ethical professional. Nick, who makes a mistake
resulting in his client having signed a contract with a provision he does not
want, represents the kind of professional dilemma that would most readily
be recognized as raising a moral or ethical issue. Nick is no doubt tempted
to cover up the truth, at least until after his partnership vote, to avoid nega-
tive consequences to himself. Both non-lawyers and lawyers would recog-
nize the moral wrong in lying to advance personal interests. Lawyers would
also recognize that basic obligations of competence and fidelity to the client
are potentially violated by Nick’s behavior. The other two situations do not
as obviously raise alternatives that implicate either personal moral values or
obligations of professional responsibility. Instead, they involve choices
among a range of possible professional action, all of which may be consis-
duction to Counseling course. It is used each fall to help teach counseling skills to Mercer’s
second-year law students. I have witnessed different lawyers perform the problem with an actor
playing the role of the client.
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tent with standards of professional ethics, but some of which are better than
others.
Despite those differences, all three scenarios capture the essence of
what it means to be a professional, including the attendant moral implica-
tions and responsibilities. All implicate the lawyers’ moral judgment and
behavior. Daphne, Nick, and Maria are each called upon to act upon their
education, experience, and expertise in these moments of professional prac-
tice. They must exercise judgment under conditions of inherent uncertainty
in a way that fulfills their professional obligations to their clients.
If a group of legal educators witnessed these situations played out in
alternative ways by different lawyers, they would have opinions about
which lawyers did a better or worse job in responding to these situations;
there may even be some consensus about those assessments. However, they
might have a difficult time describing what they are looking for in a way
that informs the structure and goals of legal education. Like obscenity, we
are more likely to recognize it when we see it than we are to be able to
describe it.5
How do we explain what we see when we watch good lawyers in ac-
tion? How does a lawyer get to the moment when she does the right thing in
the midst of conflicting values and tensions while under the pressure of
time and emotion? How is it that a lawyer accesses education, experience,
character, and skills in real time to do the right thing? What is going on in
her mind and with her emotions? How does she integrate what she learned
in law school and from her experiences in law practice so that she knows
not just the right thing to do in the moment, but also the right way to ac-
complish it? How does she tailor her response to this particular client’s
needs at this moment and also for the long term?
What is happening in Daphne’s mind and heart when she offers coun-
sel to Carla, with just a few minutes to evaluate recommendations for her
client and only a few seconds during her conversation to respond to Carla’s
emotional state or to her questions? What is happening in Nick’s mind and
heart when he puts his career and professional reputation at risk to tell his
client about his mistake and then takes the necessary steps to correct it,
including telling the members of his law firm and his malpractice carrier?
What is happening in Maria’s mind and heart when she has less than a
minute to decide what strategy to use during her cross-examination of the
injured plaintiff? And at the core of our daily enterprise as legal educators,
what is the role of legal education in preparing lawyers for these moments
of professional practice?
5. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, concurring), for Mr. Justice
Stewart’s statement regarding obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 6 19-NOV-13 15:04
200 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
C. From Professional Responsibility to Professionalism to Professional
Identity
Legal educators have struggled at times to find the appropriate lan-
guage describing what we want lawyers to do in such moments of profes-
sional practice. We have collectively used different labels to describe the
lawyer who performs well with regard to professional challenges. When
legal education first began to teach the subject of ethics, we relied on the
framework of the law of professional responsibility, focusing on the rules of
duty.6 Out of that emphasis, we developed the curricular framework for
teaching and writing about professional responsibility that still holds today.
That framework focuses on the law of lawyering, often described as the
floor below which a good lawyer must not fall, and it places the topic of
legal ethics within a discrete place academically for most law students.
Since its emergence in the 1980s, the professionalism movement has
offered us broader and more helpful language. The professionalism move-
ment’s intentional focus on legal ethics as encompassing aspirational goals
has enlarged our discussion of how to prepare ethical lawyers. However,
professionalism is still often viewed as separate from professional ethics,
and it has been subject to the criticism that professionalism is still some-
what in the eye of the beholder and easier to describe in its absence than to
fully articulate what it looks like at its best.
The publication of Educating Lawyers7 (hereafter referred to as the
Carnegie report), in 2007, offered us different helpful language and con-
cepts, particularly that of professional identity.8 It argued compellingly that
the common purpose of all professional education is to develop in our stu-
dents both specialized knowledge and professional identity.9 It provided a
framework of three apprenticeships for evaluating legal education: the cog-
nitive, practical, and normative.10 The report concluded that legal education
is strongest in developing the first and weakest in developing the third, and
it proposed that legal education should strengthen its attention to law stu-
dents’ professional identities.11 As used in the report, professional identity
provides a powerful image for understanding both the strengths and the
deficiencies of modern legal education: legal education’s traditional
strength of developing cognitive and analytical skills and its relative neglect
6. Professional responsibility has developed through, first, a canon of ethics, to next, a code
of professional responsibility, and now, to rules of professional conduct. This development had as
its purpose, in part, emphasizing that the law that governs the ethical conduct of lawyers should be
regarded as enforceable rules, that is, the minimum standards that one must meet to avoid discipli-
nary sanction.
7. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW (2007).
8. Id. at 132–144.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 29–33.
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of the apprenticeships of practice and ethics. The concept of professional
identity, as used in the report, also reveals legal education’s failure to fully
integrate the three apprenticeships.
The concept of professional identity has also been helpful in identify-
ing the complexity of the lawyer’s work and of the task of legal educators
to provide students with the right kinds of experiences to help them develop
their professional identities. It has provided a powerful image for a more
holistic approach to legal education, and it has focused attention on the
formative possibilities of legal education. The concept of professional iden-
tity formation has helped many legal educators move beyond conceptualiz-
ing the purpose of law school as about only what lawyers should think and
do, and to embrace the notion that legal education is also about who our
students are becoming. It has generated thoughtful scholarship and been the
subject of conversations and conferences.12
Like the language of professionalism, however, the language of profes-
sional identity remains a bit vague as applied to legal education. A clear
definition does not emerge from the Carnegie report. At times, professional
identity is equated with the third apprenticeship, which focuses on the stu-
dent’s growing normative and ethical capacities. At other times, profes-
sional identity is used to capture the desired outcome of a sound legal
education, which is the integration of the cognitive, practical, and normative
apprenticeships. Although I have relied heavily upon the concept of profes-
sional identity in my own work, I have found the lack of a clear definition
challenging.13 I have encountered puzzled faces when I have tried to ex-
plain that my role as a legal educator includes helping students develop
their professional identities. And in response to those puzzled faces, I have
stumbled a bit in trying to concisely explain what that means. In fact, my
failure to be concise is demonstrated by the definition of professional iden-
tity I have settled upon: “Professional identity refers to the way that a law-
yer integrates the intellectual, practical, and ethical aspects of being a
lawyer and also integrates personal and professional values. A lawyer with
12. The current symposium is an example of a conference focused on the role of professional
formation in the development of ethical lawyers, as was the Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers Con-
ference. See supra note 2. Since the publication of the Carnegie report, several of the semi-annual
workshops of the National Institute for Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism have included
discussion tracks related to the development of professional identity. See Past NIFTEP Work-
shops, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, http://law.gsu.edu/niftep/pastworkshops.
html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
13. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, We Can Do More, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129 (2010); Daisy Hurst
Floyd, Remarks published in Symposium: The Opportunity for Legal Education, 59 MERCER L.
REV. 859 (2008); Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of
Professional Identity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555 (2007); Daisy Hurst Floyd, Reclaiming Purpose:
Our Students’ and Our Own, THE LAW TEACHER, Spring 2003, at 1–2.
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an ethical professional identity is able to exercise practical wisdom and to
live a life of satisfaction and well-being.”14
In addition to its lack of clarity, I have also struggled with two other
aspects of the concept of professional identity. First, it is a neutral term: our
students will graduate with a professional identity as lawyers, regardless of
whether we are paying attention to developing those identities. The Car-
negie report has brought attention to our responsibility to develop a particu-
lar kind of professional identity and to avoid the development of the wrong
kind of professional identity. While many legal educators now agree that
we must attend to developing our students’ professional identities, we have
not yet settled on finding the right adjective for the kind of professional
identity we seek for our students. Is our goal a healthy professional identity,
a strong or positive or ethical one, or, to borrow from the professionalism
movement, are we seeking a professional professional identity?15
A second difficulty with the language of professional identity is that it
can imply that one’s professional identity can or should be separate from
one’s personal identity. I believe, as I think many legal educators do, that
lawyers cannot truly live fulfilled lives, nor meet their professional obliga-
tions well, unless they integrate their personal and professional values.16
The semantic challenge is to make the connection between the personal and
professional clear when using the language of professional identity.
In this article, I propose that we use practical wisdom as a framework
for conceiving of the purpose of legal education and further propose a re-
search agenda for understanding how to develop and support practical wis-
dom in law students and lawyers. Practical wisdom draws upon an ancient
tradition and is supported by contemporary understandings of human be-
havior and motivation. It complements the valuable concept of professional
identity and helps us understand the goal of an ethical professional identity.
We must develop an ethical professional identity in our students so that
they are able to exercise practical wisdom.
I. PRACTICAL WISDOM
Practical wisdom is derived from Aristotle, who considered it the
master virtue.17 Practical wisdom encompasses all of the other virtues, in-
14. John T. Berry, Daniel R. Coquillette, & Daisy Hurst Floyd, Legal Education and the
Formation of Professional Identity: Past and Future, Address at the American Bar Association
38th National Conference on Professional Responsibility, Boston, Massachusetts (June 2012) (on
file with the author).
15. In my opinion, the best among these choices is an ethical professional identity.
16. See also Michael S. McGinnis, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Lawyer:
Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N. DAK. L. REV. 19 (2011) (offering a compelling
discussion of the importance of integrating personal and professional values).
17. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald, ed., Prentice Hall, 1962) (c. 384
B.C.). My own understanding of practical wisdom and its relationship to professional identity has
been influenced greatly by three Mercer University symposia relating to the topic of practical
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cluding loyalty, self-control, courage, fairness, generosity, gentleness,
friendliness, and truthfulness.18 Aristotle believed that a person who knows
how to use the virtues “practically,” to apply them in concrete situations, is
wise.19 Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe offer this definition: practical
wisdom is the “right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance,
with a particular person, at a particular time.”20 Because of its emphasis on
the particular, practical wisdom is nuanced and contextual.21 It requires one
to move back and forth between the general and the particular and to adapt
understandings of general concepts and norms to particular, sometimes un-
expected, situations.22
I believe that the best lawyers possess practical wisdom.23 Practical
wisdom is a desired trait for everyone, but it is particularly important for
lawyers, who offer their clients both professional expertise and judgment
informed by wisdom. Indeed, wisdom is arguably the distinctive value that
a lawyer offers a client. The client needs more than expertise in general
rules; he seeks the lawyer’s judgment about what the rule means for his
situation, given his particular needs and goals at a particular moment.
William May explains why practical wisdom is important for lawyers:
The very ideal of the wise counselor highlights the importance of
the ancient cardinal virtues in which the virtue of practical wis-
dom heads the list. Wisdom requires a spacious openness to often
competing ends or goods which the lawyer must balance and pro-
portionately honor in a particular case. Wisdom also requires a
prudent choice of means in negotiating ends. The lawyer surely
professes a body of knowledge, including a set of laws and guild
wisdom. The proceedings of one of those, including case studies and other materials for engaging
students in the topic of practical wisdom, are in MARK L. JONES, PAUL A. LEWIS & KELLY E.
REFFITT, TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING: THE ROLE OF CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND
PROFESSIONAL FORMATION (2013).
18. ARISTOTLE, supra note 17.
19. Id.
20. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO
THE RIGHT THING 85 (2010).
21. Id.
22. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN & MATTHEW S. ROSIN, A NEW AGENDA FOR LEGAL EDUCATION:
SHAPING A LIFE OF THE MIND FOR PRACTICE 109 (2008).
23. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1995) (calling for using practical wisdom to revive the lost purposes of the legal profession).
For others who have applied Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom to discussions of legal ethics,
see Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1405
(1998); Deborah J. Cantrell, Teaching Practical Wisdom, 55 S.C. L. REV. 391 (Winter 2003);
Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127
(1998); Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on
Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5 (1995); Mark L. Jones, Perspec-
tives on Curriculum Reform, Mercer Law School’s Woodruff Curriculum, and ‘Perspectives,’ 63
MERCER L. REV. 975 (2012); Jack L. Sammons, Traditionalists, Technicians, and Legal Educa-
tion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 257 (2002–03); Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of
Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV. 161 (2002).
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regulations governing professional conduct, but neither a limitless
elaboration of that knowledge nor a mastery of the cognate social
sciences will of itself produce a wise counselor. Scientists—even
applied scientists—traffic in generalizations; wise counselors may
draw on such generalizations but they must also artfully take in
the scene and counsel, in the light of the complex of players and
particulars that congregate in a given case, whether it be a divorce
proceeding, a contract, or a criminal trial.24
Practical wisdom reveals that Nick, Daphne, and Maria are most likely
to do the right thing if they have developed certain virtues and are able to
call upon those virtues to take action that (1) meets their clients’ needs and
goals, (2) represents the fulfillment of their professional obligations, and (3)
integrates their personal and professional values. The virtues allow them to
pay attention to the particularities of the situation, to recognize how the
situation they are in is both similar to and different from other situations,
and to understand what those similarities and differences mean before tak-
ing action in these particular moments. Practical wisdom allows them to
follow the rules and norms of professional expectations, to apply the gen-
eral lessons learned through their education and experience, and to under-
stand the particularities of what these clients need in this moment. It allows
them to recognize that these are each unique situations and that what they
need to do in these situations is informed by, but is not the same as, what
they have done in any other situation. Nick, Daphne, and Maria will de-
velop the virtues that allow them to act professionally through habit, by
practicing the virtues first as students and later as they mature throughout
their careers.
In the sections that follow, I provide an overview of two modern stud-
ies of practical wisdom that have relevance for legal education. I also
briefly summarize empirical research from a variety of disciplines that can
help legal educators apply the concept of practical wisdom to the task of
preparing lawyers for ethical and fulfilled lives. I then make the case for
practical wisdom as the reframed purpose for legal education and set out a
research agenda that flows from that purpose.
A. Schwartz and Sharpe, Practical Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the
Right Thing
A recent book on professional wisdom offers help in understanding its
modern relevance.25 As noted above, Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe
define practical wisdom as “the right way to do the right thing in a particu-
lar circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time.”26 Schwartz,
24. WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS: THE PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE PROFES-
SIONAL 79 (2001).
25. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 20.
26. Id. at 85.
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a psychologist, and Sharpe, a political scientist, are professors at
Swarthmore College who have developed and taught a course in practical
wisdom. They see a disturbing erosion of the capacity for practical wisdom
in the United States today.27 They place the blame in part on our social and
governmental institutions, arguing that these institutions both fail to nurture
practical wisdom and have adopted practices that impede practical wis-
dom.28 Their critique has resonance for our work as legal educators.
Schwartz and Sharpe argue that America’s ability to exercise practical
wisdom has been eroded because of the use of rules and incentives as a
means of controlling human behavior.29 When conduct is guided only by
rules, judgment is distorted.30 One is deprived of information and discretion
that allows nuanced decisions.31 A rule-bound culture groups situations by
their similarities and differences, but does not take into account when simi-
larities and differences matter and when they don’t.32 Discretion is eroded
when all seemingly similar situations require application of the same rules
in the same way.33
Just as an over-reliance on rules erodes practical wisdom, so does reli-
ance on incentives to govern behavior.34 Incentives lead to standardization
of criteria, negating particularization and discretion, and remove the moral
dimension from behavior. Once one is motivated only by rewards, social
interactions become financial or commercial transactions rather than moral
ones.35
Schwartz and Sharpe argue that the solution is to develop “moral skill”
and “moral will,” which will in turn lead to practical wisdom.36 More spe-
cifically, Schwartz and Sharpe’s model of practical wisdom tells us that for
Nick, Daphne, and Maria to do the right thing, they must:
1. Know the proper aim or purpose of both being a lawyer and of this
particular representation;
2. Know how to improvise, which requires “balancing conflicting
aims and interpreting rules and principles in light of the particular-
ities” of the situation;37
3. Know how to read context and to see the particularities in a
situation;
27. Id. at 3–4.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 86.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 113–28.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 177–96.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 272.
37. Id. at 25.
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4. Know how to take the perspective of another, including develop-
ing empathy for others;
5. Know how to make emotion “an ally of reason;”38 and
6. Know how to make use of their accumulated experiences as a per-
son and lawyer.39
As this list demonstrates, practical wisdom is both nuanced and partic-
ular. It requires the balancing of seeming opposites. In responding to their
situations, our three lawyers must temper honesty with kindness, detach-
ment with empathy, talking with listening, and rules with discretion.40
B. Sullivan and Rosin, A New Agenda for Higher Education: Shaping a
Life of the Mind for Practice
Another recent study of practical wisdom likewise demonstrates its rel-
evance for our tasks as legal educators. The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching gathered fourteen educators from various profes-
sional and undergraduate disciplines to determine how to develop students’
capacities for practical wisdom.41 The group, convened under the title “A
Life of the Mind for Practice Seminar,” concluded that equipping students
with the capacities for exercising practical wisdom requires going beyond
higher education’s traditional emphasis on subject-matter knowledge and
critical thinking skills.42 Instead, a pedagogy for practical wisdom must in-
tegrate the acquisition of subject-matter knowledge with concepts of iden-
tity, community, and responsibility.43 Teaching that helps develop practical
wisdom requires students, first, to understand and use a body of knowledge,
which focuses on the subject-matter content of a course. It also requires,
however, that students be informed by three additional factors: (1) their
developing identities (who they are and who they are becoming), (2) com-
munity (how others use this knowledge and why), and (3) awareness of
responsibility to others (recognizing that they use their knowledge on behalf
of or in service to someone else and that there will be consequences to
others).44
38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 25–26.
40. Id. at 36–45.
41. SULLIVAN & ROSIN, supra note 22, at xvii–xx. The book and the Life of the Mind for
Practice project it describes use the term “practical reasoning” instead of “practical wisdom.” For
the purposes of this article, I use “practical wisdom” for consistency. I was one of the fourteen
faculty who participated in the seminar, based upon my Advanced Legal Ethics course. The
course, and the ways in which it integrates subject-matter knowledge with identity, community,
and responsibility, are described in Sullivan and Rosin’s book. I have also written about my expe-
rience with the project and its applicability in legal education. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Pedagogy
and Purpose: Teaching for Practical Wisdom, 63 MERCER L. REV. 943 (2012).
42. SULLIVAN & ROSIN, supra note 22, at xvii.
43. Id. at 94.
44. Id. at 93–126.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-NOV-13 15:04
2012] PRACTICAL WISDOM: REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION 207
When this approach is applied to law schools, it expands the traditional
purpose and pedagogy of legal education, which has long defined its goal as
teaching students to think like a lawyer and whose curriculum is organized
primarily around subject-matter content. The addition of the three other
goals broadens legal education’s purpose and pedagogy so that students de-
velop skills of practical wisdom. Incorporating identity helps law students
integrate their new professional roles with their existing understanding of
themselves, including incorporating their pre-law school values and con-
cerns with the new ones they are developing. Community addresses the
norms and habits of the legal profession and asks students to reflect upon
how other lawyers have acted or would act in a particular situation; it pro-
vides concrete models of lawyers in action. Responsibility challenges stu-
dents to think about both the fiduciary obligation to the client and broader
obligations for responsible deliberate action in the world at large, including
consideration of the consequences of one’s actions for others.
The pedagogy developed in the Sullivan and Rosin study captures the
best of both traditional undergraduate liberal education and professional ed-
ucation. It describes what the authors call a “pedagogy of engagement,”
which prepares students to interact with the world in practically wise ways
and has the potential to transform the formative dimension of higher
education.45
C. Practical Wisdom as Synthesis
The two studies discussed above provide arguments and means for
adopting a framework of practical wisdom to understand how the best law-
yers fulfill their professional obligations and lead satisfying lives. They also
provide a window into ways to synthesize research from multiple disci-
plines into a coherent theory that can help legal educators develop and as-
sess whether we are adequately preparing our students for the challenges of
professional practice. While not explicitly framed in terms of practical wis-
dom, research in philosophy, moral and educational psychology, profes-
sional education, and professional ethics can be synthesized within our
understandings of how the best professionals exercise practical wisdom.
This research allows the application of scientific understandings about why
people behave as they do to our task of preparing law students for the de-
mands of professional practice. In the next sections, I will briefly summa-
rize research from several different disciplines that supports reforming legal
education so that it develops practical wisdom in our students.46
45. Id. at 2.
46. Much has been written about both wisdom research and the concept of practical wisdom.
I don’t pretend to be comprehensive in my discussion of the kinds of research that can be synthe-
sized under the concept of practical wisdom and usefully applied to legal education. The areas
discussed here represent the most pertinent in my opinion at this time in my own developing
understanding of practical wisdom.
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1. Moral Psychology: Understanding the Psychological Processes
that Affect Moral Behavior
Psychologist James Rest demonstrated the psychological processes
that occur when people behave morally, identifying four needed capacities
for ethical action.47 First, one must be able to recognize that a moral or
ethical problem exists in the situation, what Rest calls “moral sensitivity.”48
For example, our three lawyers must understand that the situations they are
in and what they do in response to those situations have consequences for
others than themselves. Daphne must recognize that counseling Carla re-
quires her to be sensitive to Carla’s needs and goals as well as recognizing
her professional obligations as a lawyer. She must put aside self-interest,
such as a concern that her time on the case will increase significantly if it
goes to trial. She must also be sensitive to the professional norm that the
final decision is Carla’s, even if it is not the one that Daphne recommends.
Nick must recognize that how he handles the mistake in the contract will
affect his client’s rights and responsibilities as well as have consequences
for his career, his law firm, and its partners. Maria must recognize that the
questions she asks next in cross-examination will affect her client as well as
the witness. Whether Daphne, Maria, and Nick are morally sensitive will
depend in part on their personal values, and also on their understanding of
professional norms and expectations. They will have learned about the ap-
plicable professional norms and how to integrate them with their personal
values, through both education and experience.
But, it is not enough for our lawyers to recognize the moral aspects of
these situations. In addition to moral sensitivity, Rest found that one must
have moral judgment or moral reasoning skills.49 Our lawyers must be able
to reason through alternative outcomes to the correct decision. Rest and
other moral psychologists draw on Lawrence Kohlberg’s work to under-
stand the capacity of moral reasoning, but they expand upon it to demon-
strate that moral reasoning does not necessarily result in moral behavior.50
Rest’s work shows that there are non-cognitive factors that affect whether
one will act morally, in addition to the cognitive factors upon which
Kohlberg focused. Kohlberg demonstrated that moral reasoning skills de-
velop over a lifetime as humans potentially move through six sequential
stages, with each subsequent stage representing a more developed capacity
for moral reasoning.51 An individual in the earlier stages will act primarily
out of self-interest. One then moves through stages where external sources
47. James R. Rest, Background: Theory and Research, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRO-
FESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS 1, 22–25 (James R. Rest & Darcia Narvaez eds.,
1994).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 23–24.
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 4–10.
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of authority such as rules and the law are primary influences on one’s moral
judgment. They next move to what Kohlberg called “post-conventional
stages” in which one is focused on abstract moral principles, such as fair-
ness and justice, and acts out of an autonomous self.52 The self in the later
stages experiences consistency between internal and external values, which
is lacking in the earlier stages. While age is linked to progressively higher
stages, one is not guaranteed to move into higher stages based on experi-
ence alone. Some individuals continue to develop their capacities for moral
reasoning, while others remain at a particular stage and fail to progress.
Just as moral sensitivity is not sufficient for ethical action, neither is
moral judgment. Rest identified a third necessary capacity, “moral motiva-
tion.”53 It is not enough to recognize a moral situation and be able to reason
through to what the ethical action is. One must also be motivated to act
morally, which is a product of one’s identity. That is, Daphne may know
the right way to counsel Carla, but she must also want to do it. Will she be
able to set aside self-interest and do what this situation calls for, if neces-
sary? Will she overcome her personal desire to use an unusual legal theory
such as battered woman syndrome, or conversely, will she overcome anxi-
ety about going to trial? Daphne must be sufficiently motivated to put aside
personal concerns and exercise her professional judgment and skill so that
Carla’s needs take precedence over her own. Will Nick be motivated to set
aside his desire to be a partner in the firm, which may have been jeopard-
ized by his mistake? Will Maria be able to set aside her personal dislike for
the witness and her fondness for being known as a tough cross-examiner if
she decides that the best strategy is to handle the witness gently? Research
informs us that because one’s moral identity is shaped throughout a lifetime
by a range of experiences and influences, whether Daphne, Nick, and Maria
will be motivated to do the right thing will also be a product of their educa-
tion and experience.
Rest’s concept of moral motivation is consistent with studies that tell
us that Daphne, Nick, and Maria will be more likely to do the right thing if
they are primarily motivated by intrinsic values rather than by extrinsic val-
ues in the critical moment.54 Intrinsic values are those that carry their own
rewards and that bring joy or move one closer to fulfillment of major life
goals.55 Extrinsic values, on the other hand, are rewards such as prestige,
money, or publicity.56 That same research tells us that not only will our
lawyers be more likely to do the right thing for their clients if they are
primarily motivated by intrinsic values, but that they will also be happier
52. Id. at 4–9.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction:
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 429–30 (2005).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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for it.57 Lawyers’ satisfaction with their professional lives will be greater
when their moral actions are guided by intrinsic values.58
Finally, Rest demonstrates that our lawyers must also have a fourth
capacity, that of moral implementation.59 In addition to moral sensitivity,
moral judgment, and moral motivation, they must have the ability and the
will to carry out the moral result. Moral implementation requires courage,
resolve, and ego strength.60 It includes, for example, the courage to tell the
client bad news, or to face the jury with a potentially losing case, or to incur
the wrath of the judge or the opposing attorney on behalf of the client.
Daphne must be able to overcome her aversion to difficult conversation and
help Carla see that she must choose among two very difficult options, in-
cluding that her time in prison may begin today, without time for explaining
to her children what is happening. Nick must overcome his human tendency
to deny mistake and do the hard work of correcting it. Maria must over-
come her fear of an unsuccessful outcome to implement the choice she has
made.
Importantly, Rest emphasizes that the four capacities are interrelated.61
Moral action requires all four. Unlike Kohlberg’s model of moral reason-
ing, which is linear, Rest’s model does not call for humans to move through
stages of the four capacities. The challenge is to develop and strengthen all
four capacities so that an individual can call upon all four to act ethically.
While the capacities influence each other, they are also distinct. A person
may be skilled at one or more and not skilled at others.
The importance of the four capacities is sometimes best understood by
recognizing that deficiencies in any of them can prevent moral action.62 A
person can fail to do the right thing because of missing the moral context of
the situation. Or, a person can fail because although recognizing that the
situation has moral consequences, he lacks the ability to make moral judg-
ments, including lacking the cognitive capacity to reason through alterna-
tive decisions and consider the multiple perspectives necessary to choose
the moral outcome among competing considerations. Or, a person may have
both moral sensitivity and moral judgment, but lack the third element—
moral motivation. He may know what the right thing is to do but not be
motivated to do it because other values dominate. And finally, a person may
fail to do the right thing because although recognizing a moral dilemma,
reasoning through to the right result, and wanting to do the right thing, he
lacks the will or ability to implement the moral action.
57. Id. at 430–31.
58. Id.
59. Rest, supra note 47, at 24.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Rest’s four-part model of ethical action is consistent with practical
wisdom in emphasizing the complexity and nuance of the multiple human
capacities necessary for ethical action. But, his is not the only model that
offers helpful insight. Other commentators have noted the symmetry be-
tween modern research in moral psychology and the concept of practical
wisdom. For example, theologian Paul Lewis has noticed the way in which
modern understandings support Aristotle’s concept of the formation re-
quired to develop practical wisdom. Lewis offers the following helpful
summary:
[C]haracter develops over time and requires the expert integration
of skills in three areas that can be identified as knowing, desiring,
and doing. The skills involved in the cognitive or knowing dimen-
sion of character are many and operate at both tacit and explicit
levels, dealing with matters of both content and process. They
include perception, facility at decision-making in ambiguous and/
or complex situations, the ability to examine a situation from a
viewpoint other than one’s own and a perception of one’s self as
moral agent that includes knowledge of one’s own convictions.
The second skill set has to do with desiring. According to these
authors, to be of good character one must desire what is morally
good, i.e., foster pro-social attitudes and behaviours. In addition,
one must give priority to moral values in decision-making and be
able to control or temper one’s desires. The third skill set is that
of doing, that of acting in a manner consistent with these thought-
ful desires and desiring thoughts. These points of rough conver-
gence between some of this work in psychology and its affinities
with Aristotle suggest that his account of character remains viable
today.63
2. Educational Theory: Understanding How Education Affects
Students’ Ethical Formation
In addition to being consistent with the research of moral psychology,
practical wisdom is also consistent with modern research on the education
of professionals. Relying on William Sullivan’s three apprenticeships,64 we
know that Daphne, Maria, and Nick require integrated cognitive, practical,
and normative skills so that they can call upon all of those in moments of
professional practice to discern the right thing to do. In a precursor to his
work in the Carnegie report, Sullivan categorized the multiple capacities
required of effective practitioners into three “apprenticeships.” The best
63. Paul Lewis, In Defence of Aristotle on Character: Toward a Synthesis of Recent Psychol-
ogy, Neuroscience, and the Thought of Michael Polanyi, 41 J. OF MORAL EDUC. 155, 160 (2012),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.180/03057240.2012.
64. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFES-
SIONALISM IN AMERICA 207–10 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WORK] ; SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 27–29.
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professionals have cognitive abilities, which include analytical and reason-
ing skills. They also are well-developed in the practical skills of their pro-
fession, including such things as research, writing, counseling, and
negotiation. Finally, they have developed normatively, learning the particu-
lar ethical demands of their profession and integrating those successfully
with their personal values. The model of three apprenticeships emphasizes
the need for multiple integrated capacities; a deficiency in any of the three
can lead to poor practice.
Within those three apprenticeships, practical wisdom values the tradi-
tional purpose of legal education as “thinking like a lawyer” and the under-
standings of how to teach toward that goal. “Thinking like a lawyer” entails
highly refined cognitive skills in legal analysis and an understanding of the
substantive law that will guide the lawyer to the right result. While practical
wisdom would argue that this skill is not sufficient, it values the cognitive
dimensions of professional work, just as Rest’s model and Sullivan’s three
apprenticeships do.
A concept of practical wisdom for lawyers also takes into account edu-
cational theory that demonstrates the importance of reflection and the rele-
vance of imagination and perception to the professional’s work. Donald
Scho¨n’s concept of the reflective practitioner has influenced professional
school pedagogy over the last several decades.65 We know from Scho¨n that
if we want to create lawyers who act ethically and professionally, we need
to help them develop “knowing-in-action,”66 “reflection-in-action,”67 and
“reflection on our past reflection-in-action.”68 An action in a moment of
professional practice requires using general expertise, acquired by both edu-
cation and experience, to meet the demands of the moment, which is what
Scho¨n describes as reflection-in-action.69 Consistent with practical wis-
dom’s emphasis on adapting the general to the particular, the reflective
practitioner has both broad-based, general understandings and the often-
overlooked skill of applying those understandings to unique situations.
When Daphne counsels Carla, she is informed by her substantive and tech-
nical knowledge and by her years of experience in counseling clients on
plea offers. Her actions will begin from that base, but she will adapt in the
moment to Carla’s particular vulnerabilities and strengths and to the facts of
Carla’s legal situation. Nick’s decision about how to handle the mistake in
the contract will begin from his knowledge of a lawyer’s ethical duties, his
own moral framework, and the previous times he has had to deal with error.
65. See DONALD A. SCH ¨ON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION (1983); DONALD A. SCH ¨ON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW
DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987) [hereinafter SCH ¨ON,
EDUCATING] .
66. SCH ¨ON, EDUCATING, supra note 65, at 22–26.
67. Id. at 27–31.
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id. at 26.
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He will adapt to take into account his law firm structure, the client’s person-
ality, and possible scenarios for correcting the problem. Maria will be in-
formed by her years of trial experience, including cross-examination of
other witnesses, but also by watching the facial expressions and other body
language of the witness who is currently on the stand and adapting in a
second to what she is reading there. Our three lawyers’ abilities to adapt
that experience and knowledge to the needs of the moment demonstrate
what Scho¨n calls “reflection-in-action.”70
If our lawyers want to continue developing their professional abilities,
however, they must not stop there. Scho¨n importantly demonstrated that
adapting in the moment is not enough for continued development of ethical
capacities. After encountering the new or unexpected situation through re-
flection-in-action, the professional must then reflect upon the adaptation
and action; she must reflect upon reflection-in-action. If Daphne, Nick, and
Maria want to continuously improve as professionals, they must take the
time to reflect upon what happened in recent professional actions so that the
next time they encounter a new situation, they have learned from the previ-
ous one. Scho¨n identifies a continuous cycle of action being informed by
previous action and by reflection upon that action. He notes that “present
reflection on . . . earlier reflection-in-action begins a dialogue of thinking
and doing”71 that leads to more skillful practice. Without reflection upon
the reflection-in-action, the professional will not improve, but will be stuck
in a cycle of repetitive responses. She will be unable to respond to new
situations in adaptive ways, and her professional practice will become
mechanical.
Similarly, philosopher Michael Pritchard has called upon educators to
develop the professional’s skills of perception and imagination.72 Although
Pritchard’s ideas have developed from work with engineers, they also apply
to lawyers.73 Pritchard notes that good professionals perceive their client’s
particular situations in broad ways: they imagine both the way in which
their client experiences the situation and alternative solutions for the cli-
ent.74 Perception requires empathy,75 defined as being able to take the per-
spective of the client. Empathy is developed through careful attention to the
client.76 Empathy is not an innate ability; it is a skill that must be devel-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 31.
72. Mike Pritchard, Perception and Imagination in Engineering Ethics, 21 INT’L J. OF ENGI-
NEERING EDUC. 415 (2005) [hereinafter Pritchard, Perception]; MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, PROFES-
SIONAL INTEGRITY: THINKING ETHICALLY (2006) [hereinafter PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL] .
Pritchard also notes the importance of reflection to professional practice. Id.
73. PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 72, at ix.
74. Pritchard, Perception, supra note 72, at 415.
75. Id. at 415–16.
76. Id.
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oped.77 Without it, one will not be able to inform reason with empathy, to
appreciate what the right thing is for the situation in this moment.78 Pritch-
ard’s perspectives on empathy reinforce Rest’s work on moral sensitivity
and Schwartz and Sharpe’s description of the role of empathy in practical
wisdom, and help translate them to the context of professional action. In-
deed, Hamilton and Monson suggest that empathy can be used as a proxy
for Rest’s component of moral sensitivity.79
Pritchard links a professional’s imagination to perception, which af-
fects how humans will encounter situations.80 According to him, a profes-
sional’s perception determines what is salient about a situation. Perception
then determines what one imagines as possibilities.81 For lawyers, percep-
tion will be informed by “thinking like a lawyer,” a skill acquired through
both education and experience. It may begin with sorting relevant from ir-
relevant facts, a skill learned as a first-year law student. But it will also be
informed by the lawyer’s professional identity, which calls upon the more
sophisticated skill of integrating knowledge of professional standards with
personal values. Perception and imagination will also be determined by
non-cognitive skills such as empathy and kindness, as well as practical
skills such as interviewing and counseling.
Consistent with Aristotle’s concept of the acquisition of virtues,
Pritchard argues that professional habits and virtues can broaden the lens of
perception and insure that the professional “notice[s] what others fail to
notice.”82 He notes:
In the end, ethical values appropriate to a profession must be
joined with professional commitment, competence, and imagina-
tion in order to provide a complete picture of the virtues in pro-
fessional life . . . . This requires a blending of moral dispositions
and professional expertise; and this is not primarily a matter of
making this or that momentous, ethical decision. It is a way of
(professional) life.83
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Neil W. Hamilton & Verna E. Monson, Answering the Skeptics on Fostering Ethical
Professional Formation (Professionalism), 20 PROF. LAW 3 (2011). Equating ethical sensitivity to
empathy allows educators to use assessment techniques developed for empathy for measuring
moral sensitivity. Pritchard’s work is also consistent with the Sullivan and Rosin study, discussed
above, which found that a pedagogy for practical wisdom must include understandings of commu-
nity. See SULLIVAN & ROSIN, supra note 22. In the context of legal education, community would
include asking the student to imagine what other lawyers would do in the situation. Imagination is
useful for the professional not only as a way to understand the client’s perspective, but also as a
way to understand how others would apply professional norms and obligations to the situation.
80. Pritchard, Perception, supra note 72, at 416.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 72, at 141.
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Pritchard is not the only one who has invoked imagination as a way of
capturing the complex interaction of a professional’s capacities. The Car-
negie study of clergy education uses “the pastoral imagination” as a meta-
phor for identifying the formative goal of clergy education.84 It defines
pastoral imagination as “a distinctive way of seeing and thinking that per-
meates and shapes clergy practice.”85 The pastoral imagination results from
integrating “knowledge and skill, moral integrity, and religious commit-
ment in the roles, relationships, and responsibilities [students] will be as-
suming in clergy practice.”86 The study found that learning vital skills of
theological reflection and ministerial reflection are essential to the develop-
ment of the pastoral imagination.
Similarly, noted legal scholar James Boyd White has called for law-
yers to develop and exercise “the legal imagination,” so that they conceive
of the law broadly as “habits of mind and expectations—what might also be
called a culture.”87 In his argument to law students that they should develop
their legal imaginations, he challenges them to think about the ends of their
legal educations: “How will you, you personally, as an independent mind,
respond to and attempt to control the pressure of your training in the
law?”88
3. Professional Ethics: Understanding How Lawyers Develop and
Implement Ethical Skills
As mentioned earlier, both our understanding of lawyers’ ethical re-
sponsibilities and of professional education have been influenced by growth
in the fields of professional responsibility and professionalism. Practical
wisdom as a framework can encompass the scholarly work on professional-
ism to help us understand the complexity of capturing aspirational values
beyond the disciplinary rules that govern lawyers.
Finding a consistent definition of professionalism is challenging.
While a number of people have written about professionalism, Hamilton
notes that “legal scholars have so far been unable to construct and agree on
a widely-accepted, clear, and succinct definition of ‘professionalism.’”89
However, two particularly helpful syntheses of the literature shed light on
84. CHARLES R. FOSTER ET AL., EDUCATING CLERGY: TEACHING PRACTICES AND PASTORAL
IMAGINATION 13 (2006).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xiii (abr. ed. 1985).
88. Id. at 7.
89. Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an
Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470, 480 (2008). Hamilton notes that there are
three types of professionalism scholarship. The first discusses professionalism without defining it,
seeming to assume that the definition is self-evident; the second defines it through identification
of one or more core values; and the third dismisses it as “a misguided concept,” focusing more on
the consequences of its absence rather than defining its presence. Id. at 480–82.
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what is required of lawyers such as Nick, Daphne, and Maria. They help us
answer the question of what qualities of professionalism should be included
in a model of practical wisdom for lawyers. First, Patrick Longan has syn-
thesized the literature to identify five virtues of the professional lawyer.
They are: (1) fidelity to the law, (2) fidelity to the client, (3) responsibility
for the public good, (4) professional competence, and (5) civility.90 Simi-
larly, Neil Hamilton offers his synthesis of the professionalism literature
and has also distilled it into five attributes. They are: (1) personal con-
science (in which he explicitly incorporates Rest’s four capacities), (2) the
ethics of duty, (3) the ethics of aspiration, (4) the duty of peer review, and
(5) the fiduciary duty to refrain from self-interest in the service of the client
and the public purpose of the profession.91
Longan’s and Hamilton’s syntheses help us understand the virtues that
legal education must develop in our students if we want them to exercise
practical wisdom. They emphasize the importance of multiple integrated
capacities for ethical professional action, and they reflect the profession’s
understanding of what capacities are required.
In addition to the professionalism literature, scholarship regarding the
history of the professions and their role in American life helps us under-
stand what qualities we need in lawyers.92 Through this broader societal
lens, we understand that Daphne, Nick, and Maria’s ability to do the right
thing in these moments is not only what is best for their clients, but it also
justifies the trust placed in professionals that is the basis for the long-stand-
ing social contract between society and the professions. It is that contract
that justifies self-regulation and the privileged place of professionals in
modern society.93 Therefore, a concept of practical wisdom for lawyers
must encompass the historical justification for the peer-reviewed profes-
sions, including law.
II. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: PRACTICAL WISDOM AS A FRAMEWORK
FOR REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION
Most, if not all, of the theories discussed above have influenced legal
education in one way or another, as have other helpful concepts not dis-
cussed for reasons of limited time and space. However, legal educators have
only recently begun to take seriously rethinking the purposes and methods
of legal education. We need a coherent theory to shape the changes to
come. Practical wisdom, as a complement to the Carnegie Foundation’s fo-
cus on professional identity, is that theory.
90. Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659, 665–69 (2008).
91. Hamilton, supra note 89, at 482–83.
92. See SULLIVAN, WORK, supra note 64; WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS: THE
PUBLIC OBLIGATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL (2001).
93. MAY, supra note 92, at 55–68.
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A framework of practical wisdom builds upon an ethical professional
identity, one in which the lawyer integrates professional and personal skills
and values. It goes beyond identity, however, and demonstrates the desired
end of a developed professional identity: ethical action. Practical wisdom
also resonates more intuitively than does framing our work in terms of pro-
fessional identity alone. Because wisdom is the distinctive trait offered by
lawyers to their clients, it is easier to understand the importance of teaching
knowledge, habits, and virtues that will prepare lawyers to exercise practi-
cal wisdom than it is to explain why developing a lawyer’s professional
identity matters. Wisdom is the desired outcome; developing an ethical pro-
fessional identity is a precursor to that outcome. An ethical professional
identity is necessary, but it is not sufficient for ethical action.94
There is another advantage to practical wisdom. It addresses not just
how we prepare our students for ethical action, but also how we prepare
them for fulfilled lives. Aristotle believed that practical wisdom is essential
to human flourishing, which to him was the purpose of life. Modern happi-
ness studies show that Aristotle’s hypothesis is confirmed by science. Hap-
piness requires close social connections and is enhanced when we are
engaged in our work and find meaning in it. Schwartz and Sharpe describe
a “virtuous circle”: people are happiest when their work has meaning and
provides the discretion to use their judgment.95 That discretion allows the
development of the wisdom needed to do the work well. In turn, people are
motivated to develop judgment so that they can do their work well and
serve others, which makes them happy. “It turns out that the characteristics
of work that most demand the exercise of practical wisdom are the same
characteristics that make work engaging, meaningful, and potentially
satisfying.”96
This is good news for lawyers, law students, and legal education. By
focusing on teaching for practical wisdom, we are also enhancing our stu-
dents’ chances of living out the purpose that brought them to law school
and achieving fulfilled lives.
In sum, the framework of professional wisdom can help us understand
how the best lawyers do the right thing in the moment. It emphasizes that
we are trying to cultivate multiple capacities in future lawyers. It is broad
enough to allow synthesis of social science research about moral identity,
moral reasoning, and moral action; educational theory about how students
learn; scholarship on professions generally and lawyers, in particular; and
professional norms and values. It demonstrates that while an ethical profes-
sional identity is necessary, it is not sufficient. Identity is one of the multi-
ple capacities that students must develop so that they can exercise practical
94. See Muriel J. Bebeau, Promoting Ethical Development and Professionalism: Insights
from Educational Research in the Professions, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 366, 368 n.6 (2008).
95. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 20, at 284.
96. Id. at 280.
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wisdom. Likewise, practical wisdom makes it clear that a focus on reason-
ing—the comfort zone of legal education—is valuable, but it is not enough.
Practical wisdom provides a focus not only on what we are trying to de-
velop in our students; it answers the why.
III. MOVING FORWARD: A PRACTICAL WISDOM RESEARCH
AGENDA FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
Legal education reform will be enhanced by the framework of practical
wisdom, and legal educators can build upon existing work to understand
how to make needed reforms. We must also recognize that there are many
unanswered questions about how to adapt legal education to a new goal of
developing practical wisdom. There is a rich research agenda for those who
are interested, stemming from the particular context of professional action,
the unique history and nature of legal education, the developmental charac-
ter of acquiring the virtues that will allow one to exercise practical wisdom,
and the potential for interdisciplinary collaboration. In the following sec-
tions, I address the need for research around the following questions: (1)
how should the existing understandings of practical wisdom be adapted for
the context of professional action?; (2) what does practical wisdom look
like when exercised by lawyers in moments of professional practice?; (3)
what are effective strategies for developing practical wisdom in law stu-
dents?; (4) what are effective strategies for supporting the continued devel-
opment of practical wisdom in lawyers?; and (5) what can we learn from
other professions?
A. How Should Practical Wisdom Be Adapted for the Context of
Professional Action?
Lawyers are required to not only develop the multiple capacities for
practical wisdom, but they must do so while taking into account particular-
ized professional norms and requirements and acting in conditions of inher-
ent uncertainty. Moreover, lawyers act on behalf of someone else, a client.
At the heart of a lawyer’s actions is the fiduciary obligation owed to the
client. Therefore, ethical lawyers must not only have developed the multiple
capacities that allow them to exercise practical wisdom, they also have to
integrate those capacities with the special responsibilities of a lawyer. This
challenge brings with it another: while we expect the lawyer to act ethically,
she is also in a position to help another act ethically through the client’s
exercise of practical wisdom. Therefore, the lawyer must understand
enough about what it takes to act ethically to help her client act ethically.
A concept of practical wisdom for lawyers must take into account the
special attributes and obligations of being a professional. These include the
lawyer’s specialized knowledge or expertise, developed through lengthy ed-
ucation and enhanced by experience. That expertise includes proficiency in
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the legal profession’s normative values, including both the code of profes-
sional conduct and more tacit, communal understandings about ways of be-
having. Additionally, lawyers act on behalf of someone else. That fiduciary
obligation requires the suppression of self-interest and also calls upon an
ability to empathize with another and to imagine someone else’s perspec-
tive. This fiduciary obligation may include an obligation to help others act
as moral agents, which requires the lawyer to be able to counsel and support
clients in their own desires to act as moral agents. Moreover, members of a
profession have a duty of public service, arising from the historic relation-
ship between society and the professions. This obligation of public service
means that many professionals become community and national leaders,
calling for moral actions in enlarged contexts.
As professionals, lawyers must exercise judgment under conditions of
inherent uncertainty. They are often called upon to collaborate with others
and to act within institutional contexts. Their collective ability to display
practical wisdom justifies the trust placed in professionals by society and
the social contract that allows professionals to continue to self-regulate.
The obligations, tensions, and pressures attendant to being a profes-
sional must be incorporated into a concept of practical wisdom that will
work for legal education and the profession. However, much of the research
encompassed by a framework of practical wisdom has been developed in
the context of individuals taking actions for themselves rather than in the
particular context of professional action. There is a resulting need to build
upon our existing understandings by addressing the special nature of the
lawyer as professional.
B. What Does Practical Wisdom Look Like When Exercised by Lawyers
in Moments of Professional Practice?
As part of developing the research on practical wisdom for lawyers,
there is a need to identify what it looks like in action, to expand our under-
standing of what the best lawyers do when they exercise practical wisdom.
We need to answer such questions as: What does practical wisdom look like
when exercised by lawyers in moments of professional practice? How do
lawyers access their education and experience in real time, adapting to the
particular situation?
There is some basis for beginning this work, but expansion is needed.
We can look to research on professionalism as a model for exploring practi-
cal wisdom in lawyers, as well as the ways in which measurement tools
developed for moral psychology have been applied to professionals. Hamil-
ton has concluded that “[t]o date, no adequate comprehensive assessment
tool is available to assess a professional’s progress on internalizing the ele-
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ments of professionalism,”97 and none of the existing models has attempted
to measure the use of the multiple capacities simultaneously.
Possible methods for exploring practical wisdom include interviews,
role-playing, and surveys, as well as adapting existing tools for the situa-
tions in which lawyers must exercise practical wisdom. Rest and others
have developed tools for measuring moral sensitivity, judgment, and moti-
vation, but an effective tool for measuring moral motivation has not been
developed. Using the existing tools based on Rest’s model falls short of
capturing the whole picture of what happens when a lawyer exercises prac-
tical wisdom. Those tools measure some of the individual components of
practical wisdom. They do not address all of the components of practical
wisdom, nor do they measure the interaction of these components. Further,
Rest’s model and the measurement tools he developed have not been
adapted for the context of lawyers’ work.98
To the extent that measuring moral sensitivity, judgment, and motiva-
tion are helpful to an exploration of practical wisdom, we may look to the
work of Muriel Bebeau. She has applied Rest’s model to dental students
and dentists,99 and has developed particularized measurement tools for
moral sensitivity and moral judgment in the context of dental practice.
Bebeau has also developed a Professional Role Orientation Inventory,
which assesses commitment to professional values over personal values,
and has used exemplars in teaching dental students.100 Bebeau’s work pro-
vides a model for adapting tools to the professional context in ways that
could be helpful for legal educators.
C. What are Effective Strategies for Developing Practical Wisdom in
Law Students?
Legal education is highly formative, requiring us to be intentional
about what we are forming. The empirical research of psychologists and of
educators demonstrates that the right kinds of experiences support the de-
velopment of moral judgment and moral behavior, consistent with Aris-
97. Hamilton, supra note 89, at 503.
98. Although tools have not been comprehensively developed for applying Rest’s model to
lawyers or law students, several legal educators have recommended that they hold promise for
legal education. See Timothy W. Floyd, Moral Vision, Moral Courage, and the Formation of the
Lawyer’s Professional Identity, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 339 (2009); Hamilton & Monson, supra note
79; Clark D. Cunningham & Charlotte Alexander, Developing Professional Judgment: Law
School Innovations in Response to the Carnegie Foundation’s Critique of American Legal Educa-
tion, in THE ETHICS PROJECT IN LEGAL EDUCATION (Michael Robertson, et al. eds., 2011).
99. Bebeau, supra note 94; Muriel J. Bebeau, Influencing the Moral Dimensions of Dental
Practice, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS,
supra note 47.
100. JAMES T. RULE & MURIEL J. BEBEAU, DENTISTS WHO CARE: INSPIRING STORIES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL COMMITMENT (2005). Aristotle recommended the use of exemplars in the development
of practical wisdom, and Lawrence Kohlberg recommended that exemplars be used in developing
moral judgment skills.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 27 19-NOV-13 15:04
2012] PRACTICAL WISDOM: REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION 221
totle’s notion that the right kinds of experiences support the development of
practical wisdom. Just as important as providing the right kinds of forma-
tive experiences is avoiding the wrong kinds of experiences. The frame-
work of practical wisdom provides helpful perspectives for reimagining law
school curriculum and pedagogy so that the full potential of the formative
educational experience is captured.
First, practical wisdom and the research underlying it responds to
skeptics who argue that we have no responsibility for students’ ethical for-
mation because their characters are already formed by the time they begin
law school. Practical wisdom develops over a lifetime of experiences, in-
cluding education. Aristotle’s original understanding of practical wisdom as
the acquisition of virtues through habit, the modern formulations of his con-
cept, and the consistent social science research all demonstrate that the ef-
fort is required and is worthwhile.
Second, the complexity of practical wisdom makes it clear that foster-
ing ethical action requires that we develop multiple, interrelated capacities
in our students and that we guide them toward balanced and nuanced de-
ployment of those capacities. A framework of practical wisdom helps to
unpack the requirements of a pedagogy of ethical formation along the lines
of the Sullivan and Rosin study, or by focusing on Rest’s four capacities for
ethical action, or on particular virtues. It emphasizes the importance of
teaching skills of reflection and of developing non-cognitive capabilities,
such as empathy. It puts the development of a lawyer’s imagination on the
list of pedagogical tasks. A model that allows for this complexity helps us
understand the tasks and challenges legal educators to move beyond their
traditional emphasis on the cognitive, just as the Carnegie report does.
Third, a framework of practical wisdom reveals that law school’s tradi-
tional approach to teaching ethics is stronger on what Schwarz and Sharpe
characterize as moral skill (synonymous with Rest’s capacities of moral
sensitivity and judgment) than on moral will (synonymous with Rest’s ca-
pacities of moral motivation and implementation). Traditional professional
responsibility courses and discussions of the ethical rules in other courses
are often aimed at developing law students’ sensitivities to the particular
ethical issues that arise in lawyering situations. Similarly, the development
of judgment, including moral judgment, is a well-established strength of
legal education. The perspective of practical wisdom reveals the areas in
which legal education is deficient in teaching ethical skills. It demonstrates
that a lawyer who has only some of the needed capacities will not be
equipped for ethical action if other capacities are missing. It teaches us that
addressing only capacities for moral skill, and not those for moral will,
leaves our students, and ultimately those who depend upon them, at risk for
falling short of ethical action. Similarly, failing to teach students how to
balance the multiple capacities they are developing in ways that allow them
to pay attention and adapt to the immediate situation, leaves them unpre-
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pared for ethical action. And, developing only some, but not all, of Lon-
gan’s five virtues or Hamilton’s five attributes of professionalism, leaves
them unprepared for the challenges they will encounter. These potential de-
ficiencies, revealed through the lens of practical wisdom, reveal ripe areas
for research about law school pedagogy and curriculum.
A framework of practical wisdom also recognizes the effect of the
overall institutional environment of law school. Schwartz and Sharpe’s cri-
tique of American institutions is applicable to law school. They note that
the primary barriers to practical wisdom are rules and incentives, both of
which are often used as motivators in law school. A law school environ-
ment that creates a grade-based hierarchy or that prizes the application of
rules to the exclusion of discretion may be creating impediments to the
development of practical wisdom and therefore to our students’ abilities to
act ethically.
Fortunately, there are better-developed resources relating to the educa-
tional environment than there are relating to understanding practical wis-
dom as it occurs in moments of professional practice. For example, we can
build upon Larry Krieger’s work, which shows that law students’ moral
motivation shifts from intrinsic values to extrinsic values during the first
year of law school and that they do not experience a shift back to internal
motivations later in law school.101 This shift undermines practical wisdom.
Krieger and Sheldon have also demonstrated that students at law schools
that provide autonomy support experience lower declines in well-being and
satisfaction and other positive indicators than did students at schools with-
out autonomy support.102 Their findings underscore the importance of the
overall institutional environment for students’ ethical formation and devel-
opment of practical wisdom.
The innovative work of the Holloran Center likewise demonstrates that
particular pedagogical interventions and the right kind of institutional envi-
ronment can support the development of law students’ capacities for moral
action. Hamilton and Monson have drawn upon moral psychology to call
for legal educators to set aside their “outdated understanding” of the devel-
opmental nature of ethical capacities and adopt changes that will support
ethical formation.103 Consistently with Bebeau and with the Sullivan and
Rosin study, they have found that pedagogy that fosters students’ moral
reasoning, motivation, and identity has three characteristics: it provides
feedback on students’ ideas and conduct; it allows for self-assessment; and
it develops skills of reflection.104
101. Krieger, supra note 54.
102. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Le-
gal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory, 33 PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883 (2007).
103. Hamilton & Monson, supra note 79.
104. Id.
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Recent work on professional identity in the wake of the Carnegie re-
port highlights what are the right kinds of experiences for students’ ethical
formation and is instructive about what the wrong kinds of experiences are.
The Sullivan and Rosin study offers a framework specifically designed to
develop practical wisdom. And the development of pedagogical scholarship
during the past several decades has enlarged our understanding of the po-
tential of law school to integrate practical and normative skills with the
teaching of subject matter.105
Legal educators can look to the work of Muriel Bebeau with dental
students, which demonstrates that students learning to be professionals can
develop their ethical capacities through appropriately-designed educational
experiences.106 The pedagogy and assessment instruments she has devel-
oped for dental education are transferable to legal education.107 Also in-
structive for legal education, Bebeau has emphasized the importance of the
“educational milieu”108 in students’ ethical development as have medical
education professionals who have identified the influence of the “hidden
curriculum” on the formation of medical students.109
Understanding of legal education pedagogy has grown substantially in
the last two decades, as has the quality of pedagogical scholarship. How-
ever, a framework of practical wisdom will guide future understandings of
how best to reform legal education in productive ways.
105. See, e.g., GERALD F. HESS & STEVEN FRIEDLAND, TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAW
(1999); TEACHING THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM (Steven Friedland & Gerald F. Hess eds.,
2004); MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL., TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN: ENGAGING STUDENTS
FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE FINAL EXAM (2009); Jess M. Krannich et al., Beyond “Thinking Like
a Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward a Comprehensive View of Legal Educa-
tion, 37 DENV. U. L. REV. 381 (2009); Laurie A. Morin, Reflections on Teaching Law as Right
Livelihood: Cultivating Ethics, Professionalism, and Commitment to Public Service From the In-
side Out, 35 TULSA L.J. 227 (2000); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be Self-
Regulated Learners, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 447 (2003); Alice M. Thomas, Laying the
Foundation for Better Student Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Incorporating an Integrated
Theory of Legal Education Into Doctrinal Pedagogy, 6 WID. L. SYMP. J. 49 (2000); Stephen
Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access
to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2004).
106. Bebeau, supra note 94, at 380–81.
107. Among her recommendations are that professional schools focus on pedagogies that ad-
dress each of the four capacities Rest finds necessary for ethical action, and, that in doing so, they
use instructional methods that provide opportunities for reflection, feedback, and good assess-
ment. Id. at 380–83.
108. Id. at 380.
109. MOLLY COOKE ET AL., EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL
SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 64 (2010). The hidden curriculum includes the “enacted values” that
students experience from the institutional environments in which they are educated; its influence
is particularly damaging when they are at odds with the stated values or those that are taught in the
curriculum. Id.
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D. What are Effective Strategies for Supporting the Continued
Development of Practical Wisdom in Lawyers?
Because empirical research demonstrates that a person’s capacity to
behave ethically continues to develop over a lifetime and that the growth is
a result of their experiences in addition to education, it is vital that lawyers
are supported in their continued development of practical wisdom after they
graduate from law school. The way that professions are organized and the
structures within which professionals practice make a difference as to
whether lawyers will act ethically.
Therefore, a framework of practical wisdom provides a lens for under-
standing how bar associations, lawyers’ work environments, and other insti-
tutional actors should be organized to best support practical wisdom.
Studies such as Leslie Levin’s research into the influence of the American
Immigration Lawyers’ Association on the professionalism of immigration
lawyers provide significant insights.110 Similarly, Stephen Boutcher’s study
of law firms’ decision-making about pro bono efforts demonstrates the in-
fluence of external sources on law firm culture and the ways in which that
culture shapes those who work within it.111
If we view those, and other institutional actors, through the lens of
practical wisdom, we have a framework that can help us articulate why
certain structures and activities either support the kind of conduct we want
or erode the ability to access the multiple capacities required for practical
wisdom.
E. What Can We Learn From Other Professions?
A research agenda to understand how to develop and support practical
wisdom in lawyers should be undertaken in collaboration with those in
other professions. As discussed earlier, there is helpful work in engineering,
clergy, and dental education that has relevance for legal education. Just as
we contemplate what we want from lawyers, we can envision the complex
demands on other professionals in moments of practice. The challenges
faced by our three lawyers are similar to those faced by a clergyperson who
must respond to a fractured family at a moment of loss while struggling
with her own feelings of grief and doubt. It is similar to the challenges
faced by a trauma surgeon who must leave an important family event when
110. See Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a Site of Professionalism: The Immigration Bar
Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194 (2011). Levin notes that bar associations are one of four
institutional settings that affect lawyers’ conceptions of professionalism. Id. at 195 (citing Robert
L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Law-
yers in Context, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION 179, 185 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992)). The others are legal education,
disciplinary enforcement, and the workplace. Id.
111. See Stephen A. Boutcher, Rethinking Culture: Organized Pro Bono and the External
Sources of Law Firm Culture, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 108 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 31 19-NOV-13 15:04
2012] PRACTICAL WISDOM: REIMAGINING LEGAL EDUCATION 225
he is called to the emergency room to treat a woman who has been seriously
injured in an auto accident, requiring him to not only deal with personal
tensions but also to direct a team of other medical professionals involved in
the patient’s diagnosis and treatment and prepare for his own surgical du-
ties.112 Similarly, a structural engineer who learns that she has made a mis-
take in designing a large urban building that could cause the building’s
collapse must decide how to best address the problem, putting aside con-
cerns about her own reputation and career to protect public safety.113
For too long, legal educators have looked only to each other to under-
stand what law schools should be doing. We have more in common with
other professions than we have differences, and we can learn from both.
The Carnegie Foundation’s Preparation for the Professions project provides
an excellent starting point for interdisciplinary understanding.114 We can
build upon existing interdisciplinary work through collaborations involving
both research and teaching. Understanding how other professionals de-
velop, and then exercise, practical wisdom will enlarge our understanding
of how to meet the challenges facing lawyers and legal education.115
CONCLUSION
As we address the current challenges facing legal education, we must
think about new ways of conceptualizing and fulfilling our purpose as legal
educators. If we think about our students as they will be when they leave
us—as lawyers who face difficult challenges that require them to respond
as moral human beings and ethical lawyers—we can reimagine the purpose
of a legal education. The current emphasis on formation of professional
identity is a positive development toward that end. It holds great promise
for reform. Pairing our developing understanding of professional identity
with an understanding of practical wisdom will further enhance the oppor-
tunities for innovation for both legal education and the profession. Practical
wisdom answers the question of why it is important that our students de-
112. This scenario is based upon a more developed snapshot of a physician’s life provided in
the book Educating Physicians. See COOKE ET AL., supra note 106, at 35.
113. This is based upon the true case of William LeMessurier, who revealed the problem that
cost millions of dollars to correct. See Pritchard, Perception, supra note 72, at 419–20.
114. The Preparation for the Professions project studied law, nursing, clergy, medicine, and
engineering education. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 7; COOKE ET AL., supra note 109; FOSTER
ET AL., supra note 84; SHERI D. SHEPPARD, ET AL., EDUCATING ENGINEERS: DESIGNING FOR THE
FUTURE OF THE FIELD (2009); PATRICIA BENNER, ET AL., EDUCATING NURSES: A CALL FOR RADI-
CAL TRANSFORMATION (2010). Neil Hamilton provides an excellent synthesis of the Carnegie
Foundation’s five studies on educating professionals. See Neil Hamilton, Fostering Professional
Formation (Professionalism): Lessons from the Carnegie Foundation’s Five Studies on Educating
Professionals, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763 (2012). Hamilton finds that there is significant agree-
ment among the studies on what constitutes professional formation and what pedagogies support
professional formation. See id.at 775.
115. See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd et al., Learning from Clergy Education: Externships
Through the Lens of Formation, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 83 (2012).
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velop ethical professional identities. It also raises questions about how we
apply the lessons of practical wisdom to our particular context. Answering
those questions creates a research agenda that can enhance our understand-
ing of legal education and of lawyers’ work.
